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I would like to begin by saying that after Clanton‘s talk I am reminded why he was such a 
formidable debater in our seminars in graduate school.  And his talk reminded me how much I 
miss those debates.  Clanton has researched every aspect of race thoroughly, and his presentation 
raises several important ontological, epistemological and ethical concerns.   While I in no way 
claim to be an expert on the philosophy of race, I would like to comment on at least one 
interpretive remark that Clanton makes in his criticism of the eliminativist position.   My remarks 
will not pose an argument against Clanton‘s overarching concern about the position but are, 
rather, an internal criticism of one of his objections. 
Clanton states that one of the key points of the eliminativist position is the ethical-
historical objection that ―racial thinking and talking is too often accompanied by racist thinking 
and talking.    The very concepts employed in discussing race have been drawn on in the past to 
legitimate the denigration and subjugation of racialized communities.‖   Clanton then indicates 
that the eliminativist infers that ―if we stop talking about each other in racial terms, we will stop 
thinking racist thoughts…‖.   Clanton‘s second objection is to point out ―that not talking about 
race will not make racism disappear.‖   He then compares the mentality of the eliminativist to 
people refusing to talk about an elephant in a room, when the creature is clearly standing before 
them. 
I have two concerns about this objection.  The first is that the key premises of the 
eliminativist argument seem to be empirical claims with good sociological evidence behind 
them.   The ethical concern of racism remains the same regardless of whether or not there are 
ontological differences of race – what I take the ethical concern of the eliminativist position to 
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be, is that we have taken racial differences (i.e. secondary characteristics) to be ethically 
important historically, and that is the problem.   In order to combat racism this kind of talk must 
end.   Talking now, and in the future about the mere genetic component of race would not 
undermine their concerns; rather it would underscore the moral irrelevance of the concept.  
The second problem that I have is that I don‘t believe an eliminativist must make the 
inference that Clanton attributes to them.    The problem is not that we continue to speak about 
race, but how we have done so, that is, in such a manner that treats the notion as morally relevant 
to distinctions between human beings.    The conclusion that an eliminativist could easily accept, 
and one that would not be missing the point of their own premises, is that people need to be 
reeducated about race and that future generations are taught that secondary physiological 
characteristics have no bearing on moral worth because ―race‖ is an ontic, biological feature and 
not an ontologically (human) differentium.     
As I have already stated, I am not an expert in this area, so I would welcome Clanton‘s 
response to my remarks, and some further discussion of the eliminativist position which I do not 
pretend to fully understand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
